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AND  CANADIAN  FEDERALISM*
By  PAUL  C.  WEILER*
Mr. Justice Hughes  of the United  States  Supreme  Court once  remarked
that  "We  are  under  a Constitution,  but the  Constitution  is  what the  judges
say it is."'  This  is  almost  a truism  in  American  constitutional  law  and  we
have  it on the  authority  of  our own  Mr.  Justice  Hall  that the  situation  is
the same in  Canada.2 I  believe  that  the statement  is  essentially  correct  and
I  certainly  approve  of  this  frank  recognition  by  judges  of  their  own
responsibility for the constitutional  decisions they  are making. What I would
like to  do  today, though,  is  to  delve  deeper into  the legal  situation which  is
reflected  in  this  remark  and  ask  some  of  the  questions  it  suggests  to  the
student of the courts, if not to the constitutional  lawyers. What is there  about
constitutional  law  which  makes  the  judicial  responsibility  so  predominant?
Should such a constitutional role  lead to  a redesigning  of the Supreme  Court
along  the  lines  of  a  specialized  "constitutional  court?"  Finally,  and  most
important,  do we  really want,  or do  we  really  need, in  a federal system,  the
kind of constitutional  umpire  whose performance  is, I think, aptly  conveyed
by Hughes  J.'s comment?
I  shall  begin  my  analysis  by  a  sketch  of  a  case  study  - our  recent
constitutional  cause  c~l~bre  arising  out of the  "chicken  and  egg war".3  This
was  primarily  an  engagement  fought  by the  bordering  provinces  of Ontario
and  Quebec.  Ontario  farmers  produced  an  abundance  of  cheap  eggs  and
Quebec farmers an abundance  of cheap chickens. The surplus producers  were
naturally  interested  in  the  market  of  the  consumers  in  the  neighbouring
jurisdiction.  Equally naturally, though,  the  somewhat  less  efficient  producers
of  each  product  were  not  so  enamoured  of  competition  within  their  own
bailiwick.  When they went to their own government for protection,  the result
was  the  creation  of  marketing  schemes  under  enabling  legislation.  These
provided for the controlled marketing,  at fixed prices,  of all the chickens  sold
-,This  lecture  was  delivered  at  the  Osgoode  Hall Law  School  on  19  January  1972
and  has  been  reprinted  with  the  kind  permission  of  the  Osgoode  Hall  Law  School.
Professor Weiler's  lecture,  together with the other  lectures  of the same series,  have  now
been published  in book  form  under the  title of Law and Social Change (Osgoode  Hall
Law School,  1973).
**  Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1 Quoted from Pusey, Hughes, at 204.
2  In an unpublished lecture Law Reform and the Judiciary's  Role given at the  Osgoode
Hall Law School on September 29,  1971.
3 For  the political  background  to  the  court's  decision  I  have  relied  essentially  on
newspaper  accounts  throughout  1971.  One of the best  such stories  was in  the Financial
Post of May  29,  1971,  at  1 and  6.  The Supreme  Court of Canada  decision  is reported
under the name  The Attorney-General for Manitoba v. The Manitoba Egg and Poultry
Association, [1971]  S.C.R. 689, affirming the Manitoba  Court of Appeal decision reported
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in  Ontario  and  all the eggs  in  Quebec,  whatever  the  source.  Unfortunately,
it appears  that  the  marketing  boards became  a little  greedy  and  went  even
further to give undue preference in marketing to  those products coming from
within the province. Even worse, this had adverse effects on producers in other
provinces  such  as Manitoba,  which,  as  a consistent  producer  of agricultural
surpluses,  was  the classic innocent and injured bystander in the "chicken  and
egg war".
On  the surface,  I  find  it rather  hard  to  see  what  the  courts  have  to
contribute  to  the resolution of this essentially political and economic conflict.
There  certainly  was  ample  scope  for  bargaining  and  negotiating  terms  of
settlement which  might offer at least something to everyone.  One could under-
stand that the federal government, which represented producers and consumers
from all affected jurisdictions, might have been an appropriate arbiter. Unfor-
tunately,  earlier  judicial  decisions  of  the  twenties  and  the  thirties  had
themselves  created  the  very  institutional  gaps  which fostered  such interpro-
vincial marketing conflicts.4 At this very time though,  the federal government
was  attempting  to  shepherd  through  Parliament  a  new  Farm  Products
Marketing Act which would attempt to  ameliorate  these  deficiencies  through
a  complicated  process  of  inter-administrative  delegation.5  Though  there
appeared to  be substantial consensus  in  favour of the  general  scheme  of the
Bill  by  both  federal  and  provincial  ministers  of  agriculture,  it  was  being
delayed  by  opposition  members  who  largely  represented  western  farming
interests. In the interim,  the federal  government  had carefully  resisted many
calls  to  refer  the  "political"  dispute  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  for
immediate  "legal"  resolution.
Unfortunately,  Manitoba,  which was understandably  loath to wait for a
political decision on the larger questions,  devised a scheme for circumventing
this  reluctance  of  the  federal  Justice  Minister.  This  provincial  government
manufactured  a  controversy  by  initiating,  through  a  proposed  Order-in-
Council, a carbon copy of the Quebec scheme, providing for Manitoba control
of the marketing of  extra-provincial  eggs  in Manitoba.  It then referred  these
regulations  to the Manitoba Court of Appeal for a decision about their consti-
tutionality, under its own provincial reference legislation. When the Manitoba
Court of Appeal  decision  was unfavourable  as to  the  constitutional  validity
of the scheme, the Manitoba government was entitled as of right to appeal this
"loss" to the Supreme Court of Canada. In this way, it could achieve a binding
decision  as  to  all  such  schemes  which  would  be  authoritative  in  all  the
provinces.
4 The  important  decisions  were  Eastern Terminal Elevator v.  The  King,  [1925]
S.C.R. 434, Lawson v. Interior  Fruit  Committee,  [1931]  A.C.  357  and Attorney-General
for B.C. v. Attorney-General for Canada, [1937]  A.C.  377.  Other  significant  decisions
limiting the trade  and commerce power in related  areas were In Re Board of Commerce
Act,  [1922]  A.C.  191  and  Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider, [1925]  A.C. 396.
The sad story is told in A. Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada  and the United States
(Toronto:  Butterworths,  1963),  and  R.  E.  Johnston,  The  Effect of Judicial Review  on
Federal-State Relations  in  Australia, Canada and  the  United States  (Baton  Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1969), ch. VI.
5 Farm Products  Marketing Agencies Act, S.C. 1971,  c. F-65, previously  Bill  C-176,
28 Parl., 3rd Sess.
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Questions might be asked about the propriety of this apparent subversion
of the adversary  process when the Manitoba government  purported  to  argue
for, and then  appeal  on behalf of, laws  which  it was  proposing  to  enact for
the sole  purpose  of having them  declared  unconstitutional.  Of  more general
and recurring  concern,  though,  are  the  deficiencies  of the  Reference  device
itself which the Manitoba government  was attempting to utilize in order to get
this political and economic dispute settled.6 If there are any two characteristics
of the judicial  process  which  give  it some  qualifications  to  resolve  constitu-
tional issues, they are that the disputes  arise in a concrete factual setting and
are  adjudicated by a neutral  impartial arbiter.  Because  a very  specific  fact-
situation  triggers  the litigation  which  appeals  to  a court  for a  constitutional
ruling,  the  judge  has  the  benefit  of  being  able  to  focus  on  the  real-life
implications of the decision he is making and thus  to carefully tailor and limit
the reach of the determination as he sees  fit. Moreover,  the neutrality  of the
judge  is  preserved  by  an  adversary  process  which  requires  the  interested
parties to bring the relevant factual background before  the Court, depicted in
as favourable a light as possible from each point of view.
In  the  Manitoba  Reference,  both  of  these  advantages  of  adjudication
were  dissipated.  There  was  no  concrete  focus  around  which  the  reasoning
of the  court  could  be  organized,  nor was  the  factual  economic  background
to  the  statute  depicted.  The  Manitoba  government  conspicuously  omitted
to set out in the  Reference  the relevant  economic  background  which  might
well have supported the reasonability of provincial  action in the area.  Ontario
and Quebec, which were vitally interested in sustaining this kind of legislation,
did  not  have  an  opportunity  to  present  this  factual  support.  Indeed,  the
questions  which the Manitoba government  posed to the  Court did not focus
on  what  appears  to  have  been  the  real  character  of  the  dispute  - the
discriminatory  application  of  provincial  marketing  quotas  against  out-of-
province  producers  - and instead  required  the  Court  to  make  a  blanket
decision  about  the  legality  of  any  such  marketing  scheme,  no  matter  how
favourably  it might be  applied  to  extra-provincial  products.  In my  opinion,
the most sensible response would have been a forthright refusal to answer the
questions  on the  grounds  that  the  dispute  was  not  appropriate  for  judicial
resolution.  One senses  that Mr. Justice Laskin, who  was especially  critical  of
the  abstract  character  of  the  Reference,  was  drawn  in  this  direction,  but
eventually  the legal mystique  surrounding  issues  of federalism  overcame  his
reluctance.  The  majority  opinion  proceeded  blithely  ahead,  without  any
apparent  concern  for  the  complex  and  inter-related  political  or  economic
interests  involved  in  the  dispute,  and  the  Court  gave  Manitioba  the  broad
legal  weapon  it was  hoping  for.
Are  there  any inadequacies  in the  substantive  reasoning  and results  of
the Court which may reflect some of these procedural  deficiencies?  A casual
reading  of the  opinion  certainly  indicates  the  truth  of  Hughes'  dictum  that
"the constitution  is what the judges  say it is". In the first place,  the Supreme
Court  is  attempting  to  work  out  a  distinction  between  regulation  of  inter-
provincial  and intra-provincial  trade.  However,  this is a purely judicial  gloss
6The  law and  policy  relating  to the  Reference  device  in  Canada  is  canvassed  in
B. Strayer, Judicial  Review of Legislation in Canada  (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1968), ch. 7.
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on the text of the B.N.A.  Act, which has become  constitutional  dogma  with
little real assessment of the reasons for it. It began with Citizens Insurance v.
Parsons, 7  a  Privy  Council  decision  which  upheld  the  validity  of  fairly
innocuous  provincial legislation  regulating  the  terms  of insurance  contracts.
In  order  to  do  so,  the  Court  excluded  provincial  intervention  from  the
economy  only when  it amounted  to  "regulation  of trade in  matters  of inter-
provincial concern".  Soon this formula  became  constitutional  dogma  for the
converse  problem - determining  the  ambit  of  valid  dominion  legislation.
Because  there  has  never  been  any  real  assessment  of  the  reasons  why  we
should  have  such  a judge-made  allocation  of  legislative  authority,  it  is  not
surprising  that the courts  have never  discovered  how to  apply  it in  anything
but a wooden  and legalistic  way.
The underlying  functional  problem is that  consumers  of farm  products,
who  are  making  purchases  through  a  national  currency  and credit  system,
cannot meaningfully  be regulated by a legislative  body which has jurisdiction
over  some  portion  only  of  the  undifferentiated  products  which  are  being
marketed  to them. If the federal government  alone  can control the marketing
of  extra-provincial  products  or trade  and  the  provincial  government  alone
can control intra-provincial  products  or transactions,  then  there  will have  to
be substantial identity in the content of co-ordinated legislation  in  order  that
the  regulatory  goals  of  either  can  be  achieved.  Otherwise  the  supply  of
unregulated  goods  will  frustrate  the  orderly  marketing  and  price  supports
which are  the major thrust of current  farm  policy. However,  the  attainment
of  co-operation  always  faces the  obstacle of  possible federal  disinterest in  a
relatively  localized  problem, or  a parochial  local  veto  of  legislation  desired
by the federal government and a majority of the provinces. Hence, the require-
ment  of  co-operative  action  is  always  risky,  time-consuming,  and  in  the
interests  of  those  who  do  not  want to  be  regulated,  and  who  win  from  a
governmental  decision  not  to  intervene,  whether  it  comes  on  the  merits  or
not.
This is  the economic  background to the various statutory  schemes which
came  up  for  constitutional  review  in  the  light  of  this  concept  of  "inter-
provincial trade". A lengthy series of precedents  sustained the constitutionality
of  non-discriminatory,  provincial  schemes  for  the  orderly  marketing  of
products within their borders,  whatever the source  of destination. In Shannon
v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board, 8  the  Privy  Council upheld  com-
pulsory marketing  of  milk through provincial boards  situate in  the province,
and  considered  it quite  unimportant  that  some  of  this  milk  was  produced
outside  the  province.  Shortly  afterwards,  in Home  Oil Distributors  Ltd.  v.
A.-G.  British Columbia, 9  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  provincial  fixing  of
minimum  and  maximum  prices  of  gasoline  and  fuel  oil  in  reliance  on
Shannon. It was  clear from extrinsic  evidence that this legislation was aimed
at  extra-provincial  (in  fact  foreign)  producers  who  were  dumping  surplus
fuel  oil  in  B.C. at such  low  prices  that it  was  destructive  to the  B.C.  coal
industry, and who were recovering their losses from extortionate prices charged
7  [1881]  7 A.C. 96 at 113.
8 [1938]  A.C. 708 at 717.
9 [1940]  S.C.R. 444.
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for  gasoline,  for  which  there  was  no  local  alternative.  The  Court  simply
applied the  formula  that  the regulation  applied  only  to  products  once  they
were inside the province and said that if the plaintiffs "desire  to carry on their
business in the Province of British Columbia, they must comply with provincial
laws  in  common  with  all  provincial  and  independent  dealers  in  the  same
commodities".  In the  face  of  these  two  precedents,  it  would  seem  difficult
indeed for  the  Supreme  Court  to  hold  the  Manitoba  scheme  invalid  under
existing  law.
However,  some retreat from the very wide  compass  given  to  provincial
powers  might  have  been  seen  in  the  Ontario Farm Products ReferenceO
which  dealt  with  the  opposite  side  of  the  marketing  coin  - provincial
competence  over locally-produced  products  destined for outside the province.
The Court for the first  time appeared to  recognize  that  there are few, if any,
marketing transactions which cannot be described, at least abstractly, as taking
place  within  one  province,  while  there  are  few  intra-provincial  transactions
which do not have ramifications  outside the province. Some judges tried to lay
down certain dividing lines as  to when  a product could be said to be in inter-
provincial  trade  and  thus  outside  provincial  control.  The  important  factor
appeared  to be whether  the products  were  intended  to be  sold,  directly  or
indirectly  (i.e.,  after processing) to consumers within that province. Unfortun-
ately, the very abstract character of this Reference"  deprived  these efforts  of
any real  significance,  as was  indicated by the next  case, Carnation Company
Ltd. v. The Quebec Agricultural  Marketing Board 12 - involving real facts  and
a concrete dispute.
In the Carnation case, a  Canadian incorporated  company with  its head
office in Toronto,  operated  in  Quebec both a receiving  station for milk  and
a  processing  plant.  It  bought  raw  milk  from  about  2,000  farmers  in  the
relevant area, sent most of it to the plant to be processed into evaporated milk,
and skimmed some of the milk and sent it to be processed in an Ontario plant.
The major  consumer  market  for  the  evaporated  milk  was  outside  Quebec.
Under  provincial  marketing  legislation,  a  majority  of  area  milk  producers
organized a marketing plan which regulated all sales of raw milk to Carnation
Co.,  with  provision  for  government  arbitration  of  price  in  case  of  non-
agreement. It appeared  as  a result that Carnation had to  pay  a  significantly
greater  price  for  raw  milk  than  other  purchasers  from  the  same  area  and
eventually Carnation objected to the constitutionality  of an arbitration  award.
However,  the Supreme  Court,  in an  opinion  written by Martland  J.,  upheld
the provincial scheme  on the theory that each transaction  and each regulation
must be examined in relation to its own facts:
In  the present  case,  the  orders  under question  were  not,  in  my  opinion,  directed
at the regulation  of inter-provincial  trade. They did not purport directly to control
or to restrict  such trade. There was  no evidence  that, in fact,  they  did control  or
restrict it. The most that can  be said  of them is  that they  had some  effect  upon
the cost  of  losing  business  in  Quebec  of  a  company  engaged  in  inter-provincial
trade, and that, by itself, is not sufficient to make them invalid. 13
10  [1957]  S.C.R. 198.
11 See discussion in Strayer, supra, note 6 at 178-79.
12  [1968] S.C.R. 238 at 253.
13 Id., at 254.
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In  the face  of this  decision,  I suggest that it would be very difficult  to
invalidate  the proposed  Manitoba  Egg  scheme  and,  in  order to  do  so,  the
Court  would  have  to  make  and  justify  a  very  substantial  change  in  the
direction  of  Canadian  constitutional  law.  Of  course,  the  two  older  cases,
Shannon and  Home  Oil  were  directly  on  point  and  firmly  in  favour  of
provincial  jurisdiction.  Whatever  hints  to  the  contrary  we  might  have  seen
in the Ontario Farm  Products  Reference, dealing with  an analogous situation,
seemed put to rest by the Carnation case. Yet the Court,  without a hint that
it  was  doing  any  more  than  following  a  long,  unbroken  line  of  decisions,
turned  around  and held  the Manitoba  scheme invalid.  The  majority opinion
of  the Court was  again  written by Mr.  Justice Martland,  and the  sum  total
of his reasoning  to this  conclusion  is  contained in the  following  passage:
It is my opinion that the plan now in issue not only affects inter-provincial trade in
eggs, but that it aims at the regulation  of such trade. It is an essential  part of this
scheme, the purpose of which is to obtain for Manitoba producers the most advan-
tageous marketing  conditions  for eggs,  specifically  to control and regulate the sale
in Manitoba of  imported  eggs. It  is designed  to restrict  or limit  the free  flow  of
trade between provinces as such. Because  of that, it constitutes an invasion of the
exclusive legislative  authority of the Parliament of  Canada over the matter of the
regulation of trade and commerce.14
In  my  opinion,  this  argument  is  completely  question-begging,  as  a
response to the legal authority even if Carnation  decided less than three years
before  (let alone the older but more direct precedents  of Shannon and Home
Oil).  No  doubt  there  are  factual  distinctions  between  the  two  marketing
schemes,  but I do  not believe that there are meaningful  economic differences
relevant  to  the  central  legal  issue:  should  one  province  have  the  power  to
control  agricultural  marketing  inside  its  boundaries  when  this  necessarily
affects  or  "concerns"  the  interests  of  citizens  in  other  provinces?  I  will
indicate  my  reasons  for  this  statement  shortly but  I  should  first point  out
that even  if I  am wrong in this  judgment,  there is  not one  sentence  in the
majority  opinion which  purports  to  show  why  one  scheme  is  valid  but the
other  is  not. Instead,  we  are  given  only  labels  - "affects"  inter-provincial
trade  or  "aims  at the  regulation"  of such trade.  These  the individual  judges
apply in some mysterious fashion to produce  a result which they tell us is the
law, or at least the law for the time being.
What  is  the  functional  or  economic  significance  of  the  scheme  in the
Manitoba Egg Reference and  how  does  it  compare  to  that  in  Carnation?
Manitoba  producers  were  authorized  to  create  marketing  boards  composed
of people  elected by them and charged with achieving  the most advantageous
marketing  for their  product.  To  this  end  the boards  were  given  powers  to
market all eggs  sold in the province, and to  require the grading, packing  and
marketing  of  all  such eggs at  a station, the  operation  of which  is under the
control of the board. All eggs coming  from outside the province were  subject
to the scheme  and the place of origin of such eggs  was to be marked  on the
container. No  doubt the major  problem in  this  legislation was  that it could
be  administered  in a  discriminatory  fashion  (and,  as  I  have said,  apparently
was  so operated  in other provinces.)  If extra-provincial  eggs were  not given
a fair  share  of marketing  quotas,  and  were  kept out  of  provincial  markets
14Supra, note 3 at 703.
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until provincial  eggs  were  sold, this  would be an  obvious  reason  for invali-
dating  the legislation  in operation.15 However,  actual  discrimination  was not
the assumption  on which the Reference  was  made,  argued,  and  decided  and
the dangerous  character  of the decision is that it seems  to bar subjection  of
extra-provincial  products  to  even  a fairly-administered  provincial  regulatory
scheme.
16
The economic  purpose of this kind  of marketing legislation is protection
of the markets  and prices  of Manitoba  producers  at the expense  of Manitoba
consumers.  In  order  to  achieve  this  result  of  price  supports  and  orderly
marketing  in  an undifferentiated  market  for  eggs,  it is  necessary  to  subject
producers  from  other  provinces  to  the  same  limitations  in  dealing  with
Manitoba  distributors.  On the other  hand,  the purpose  of the  legislation  in
Carnation is  to  protect  Quebec  producers,  at  the  expense  of  mainly  non-
Quebec  consumers,  without any limitation  on non-Quebec  producers.  In the
final analysis, the only difference is that in Carnation  the wholesale marketing
and  prices  of  Quebec  milk  are  controlled  by  Quebec  law  - whether  it is
destined for inside or outside Quebec - while  in the Manitoba  Egg case,  all
eggs sold in Mantoba are to be marketed and priced under Manitoba  controls,
whether they come from within or without Manitoba. Yet Martland J.  decided
that,  "on its own facts",  the Manitoba legislation is  in relation to trade  and
commerce,  as  well  as  affecting  it,  and  thus  unconstitutional.  As  to  the
Carnation  scheme, again, "on its own facts" he said it merely had some effect
on  inter-provincial  trade,  and  was  valid.  If there  is  a  difference,  which  is
relevant to the federal  division  of legislative  power, it is not apparent to me,
and  certainly not  adverted to  on the  face  of the  opinion.
Laskin, J.'s opinion is much more sophisticated,  especially in recognizing
the  difficulties  faced  in trying  to  answer  such  a question  of constitutionality
on  a  Reference  with  no  supporting  factual  or  economic  data.  However,
unfortunately,  he does  not appear to  consider  the  possibility that, in  such  a
situation,  discretion  may  be  the  better  part  of  valour.  He  says  that  the
"proposed  scheme has as a direct object the regulation  of the importation of
eggs,  and it is not saved by the fact that the local market is under the same
regime". 7 His  only practical  reason for holding this  to be invalid is  that it
denies "one of the objects of Confederation...  namely to form an  economic
unit of the whole of Canada."  Unfortunately,  he does not tell us why  this is
the case for this kind of legislation and not so in Carnation,  and, in any event,
what are  the  evils  in a non-discriminatory  provincial  scheme for  controlled
marketing and price supports for all eggs sold in the province, whatever their
source.
The functional problem which the Court is required to face in the case is
the  degree  of latitude which  a province  should be  allowed  in subjecting  the
151 might add that section  121  of the B.N.A. Act would likely make  this unconsti-
tutional,  even for the federal government.  See the  discussion by Rand,  J.  in Murphy v.
C.P.R., [1958]  S.C.R. 626 at 638 ff.
16 However, Mr. Justice Pigeon, in a cryptic concurring opinion (at 723),  agreed with
the majority conclusion  only for the explicit reason  that  the scheme  enabled  the  Board
to use  quotas  to give  preference  to sale  of local  eggs,  even  if this might mean  a total
prohibition on the sale of out-of-province eggs.
17 Supra,  note 3 at 717.
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business  sector  of our society  to  regulation  within  its borders.  As  a  matter
of  plain,  economic  facts,  the  inter-dependent  nature  of business  activity  in
this country is such that almost all provincial regulations will have ramifications
on citizens  and enterprises  outside  the country, whether  or not the legal rule
technically  applies only to purely intra-provincial  trade or transactions.  More-
over, the citizens  of these provinces,  who  are so affected  by these  regulatory
decisions,  have  no real say in  the election  of the  representative  governments
which  make  them.  Hence  the  arguments  which  can  be  made  for  judicial
laissez-faire  with  respect  to  democratically-elected  parliaments  do  not  have
the same  weight  as in many  of the other constitutional  areas  decided by the
Court.
Interestingly  enough,  although our  Supreme  Court has  never looked  for
illumination in American cases, since  1949 there has been a very sophisticated
debate  about  the proper judicial  role  in  controlling  state-enacted  "burdens"
on inter-state  commerce.18 One position - that  of Jackson - takes the view
that if a state enacts  a law which  imposes  a  significant  burden on commerce
within the national free-trade economic  unit, it should be struck down. Black,
at the other pole,  holds that  if the state  has  a reasonable interest  of its  own
in the object of the regulation,  and the law does  not  attempt to discriminate
against out-of-state business as such, it should be upheld.  An interim position
- formulated  by Stone  and probably  reflective  of the  majority view  in the
Court  and  among  academic  commentators-  holds  that  the  Court  should
balance  the  legitimate  benefits  achieved  by  the  states  from  the  regulations
against  the burdens  inflicted  on inter-state  commerce  and  only invalidate  the
law if the latter  exceeds  the former.
This brief statement of the opposing positions  does not of course convey
a sense of the detailed  and sophisticated examination undertaken  by the U.S.
Supreme  Court in  making  these  inquiries.  It is  clear,  though,  from  a  com-
parison of the reasoning and results in Carnation  and the Manitoba  Reference,
that  our  Court  is  either  incapable  of,  or  unwilling  to  perform  the  same
function.  If the  Court had  taken  Black's  approach,  I believe  both  schemes
would  be  held  valid  (at least  on  their  face),  while  if  they  took  Jackson's
approach,  both  would  be  held  invalid.  If  Stone's  intermediate  view  was
adopted,  the Court would have had to  weigh  the competing  interests  of  the
legislating province  in the respective  schemes  and  those of the  nation in the
free  flow  of  a  national  fair  market.  What  we  received  though  was  only  a
judicial  ipse dixit which may  have  authoritatively  resolved  the dispute-  in
the way Manitoba  wanted - but did  so  with  no  supporting  reasoning.
There  are  some  observers  who  will  not  be  troubled  by  this,  and  will
believe  that  what  the  Court says  is  law  and  must  be followed,  and  that is
the end of that.  Unfortunately  others,  especially those  adversely  affected  by
this  "law",  will  ask  why  they  should  unquestioningly  accept  the  initiative
judgments of the Court. Ontario and Quebec  will simply say that  they believe
their  legislation  is  somewhat  different  from  that  involved  in  the  Manitoba
18 A recent  book by  P. R.  Benson,  The  Supreme  Court and the  Commerce Clause
(New  York:  Dunellen,  1970)  has  an  excellent  discussion  of  the  different  positions  in
Chapter 7.  Perhaps the leading case illustrating the alternative views  is Southern Pacific v.
Arizona ex rel Sullivan (1945), 325 U.S. 761.
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Reference and  there is no principle  or reasoning in the latter case  which can
indicate whether  or not these distinctions  are specious.  In any event, it seems
that  shortly  afterwards  the  affected  governments  met  and  engaged  in  some
serious  bargaining which  was  directed  toward the real  conflicts  and problems
in the area. This was to be expected because it is hard to see how the "winner
take all" kind of judicial decision could be an acceptable basis for resolving a
very  complex problem involving not  only a conflict  between  different  groups
of producers,  but an equally  vital conflict  between  producers  and  consumers
who  vote  in  the  same  province.  The  most  intriguing  comment  made  just
before the meeting of the ministers of agriculture  was that they were all agreed
then  on just one thing - that the Supreme  Court  decision  would not be the
basis  of their  final  settlement. 19
What  is  the significance  of  the Manitoba Egg Reference? I  believe  the
case  is typical of the very complicated  political and economic  conflicts  which
are  the  "stuff"  of  constitutional  adjudication.  Even  more,  it  suggests  the
paradoxical character  of  "government by lawsuit"  as the preferred  technique
for resolving these conflicts.  Why do we have the institution of judicial review
19 In my  experience,  it is the layman  who  is most  often  caught up in the  mystique
of the theory that whatever a court says is law, and because it is the law it must be obeyed.
The  following  editorial in  the Toronto  Daily  Star about  the  governmental  negotiations
relating to the Manitoba  Egg case is instructive in this regard:
DEFIANCE OF LAW IN CHICKEN WAR.
"An ominous note -at  least for any  Canadian  who  hopes  for the  survival  of a  united
Canada - was struck  at the opening yesterday  of a  conference  of four provinces  and a
federal representative  to consider the inter-provincial  trade war over chickens and eggs.
The  conference  was  held  in the  wake  of  a  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  decision  that  a
Manitoba  statute restricting the import of eggs from Quebec  was unconstitutional  because
it dealt with  trade between  the provinces,  a subject reserved  to the national  government
under the British North America  Act. Since the Manitoba  statute was  virtually  a carbon
copy  of the  Quebec  Act which  started  the trouble,  the judgment  obviously  renders  the
Quebec legislation invalid as well.  The normal reaction of a provincial government,  when
confronted with such a court decision,  has always been to accept the verdict and  abandon
the unconstitutional law.
But the present Quebec cabinet is reacting differently. As the conference  opened, a Quebec
spokesman had this to say. "This meeting will start on the premise that the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision brought about by a Manitoba  action  is not to be regarded as a
guideline for settlement. It is hoped that an agreement can be negotiated amicably that will
end any further need for recourse to the courts."
Apparently  Quebec  means to ignore the Supreme  Court decision  and  go on  enforcing  its
own  restrictions  on  egg  imports  from  other parts  of  Canada.  Apparently  it  hopes  to
persuade  the  other governments  taking part  in  the conference - of Manitoba,  Ontario,
Nova Scotia and  Canada-  to do likewise.  The argument raised to justify this  is that the
judgment  applies  to  Manitoba  alone  because  its  egg-control  regulations  are  slightly
different from Quebec's;  but this is  a thin excuse,  since  it was the principle  of provincial
interference with interprovincial trade, not the fine  details,  which the court condemned.
We  trust the other  governments  at  the conference  will  refuse either  to  follow  Quebec's
policy disregarding the Supreme Court decision,  or to be drawn into some pact or arrange-
ment to get around it.
In this connection, a particular responsibility rests with the federal cabinet.  Prime Minister
Trudeau  stated last June  29  that he  would  enforce  the Supreme  Court's  ruling  against
barriers  to inter-provincial  trade.  Now  is  the  time  to carry  out  that pledge,  even  if it
requires  such  a drastic  and unusual step as  disallowance, by  the federal government,  of
any contrary provincial laws."
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within Canadian  federalism? 2 0  It is not  explicitly provided  for in the text  of
the  B.N.A.  Act  and  the  Confederation  Debates  do  not reveal  an  explicit
agreement that it should be adopted. In fact,  the preamble  to the B.N.A. Act
indicates  an  intention to  establish  a constitution  similar  in  principle  to that
of  the United  Kingdom.  As Dicey was to  record shortly thereafter, the basic
principle of  the British  constitution  is  parliamentary  sovereignty  and  British
courts  do  not have  the  power  to  review  and  invalidate  legislation.  Perhaps
this aspect of the British model was inapplicable to a federal system of divided
legislative authority. However,  there is no record of an explicit consensus and
decision  among the  Fathers  of Confederation  that  Canadian  federalism  did
require judicial review  and there is  some indication  they believed  conflicts  of
jurisdicton  would rarely  arise. 2 1
Yet judicial review did come to be exercised in Canada immediately after
Confederation  and  encountered  so  little inquiry  or debate  that it must have
been tacitly assumed by everyone  to be proper. An understanding of its legal
basis  at  that  time  is  important  for  anyone  who  is  assessing  the  continued
viability  of the institution  one hundred  years later. By virtue of the Colonial
Laws  Validity Act of  1865,  which clarified earlier  judicial  practice,  colonial
statutes  would be void for repugnancy,  if  they conflicted  with  Imperial  laws
extending  to  the  colony.  Colonial  courts,  as  well  as  the Privy Council,  has
customarily  reviewed  "subordinate  governmental  legislation"  in  the  colony
and assessed their legal validity in this way. The B.N.A. Act was an Imperial
statute  extending  to the  colony  of Canada  and it explicitly  authorized  legis-
lative jurisdiction only when  it fell within  certain  "exclusive"  areas  allocated
to  either the  Dominion or the  provinces.  When  either  of these  subordinate
bodies purported to  act beyond the powers  created by the British statute, its
legislation  would conflict with  an Imperial  law,  thus triggering  the  Colonial
Laws  Validity  Act.  Hence,  a  private  citizen  affected  by  any  Canadian  law
could always impugn the validity of these laws  by persuading  a court that it
was  inconsistent  with  the  superior Imperial  law, which  the  court  was  duty-
bound to consider  in deciding the instant  case.
It is because of this legal background that Canadian  constitutional theory
has never enjoyed a debate, similar to that in the United States since Marbury
v.  Madison, 22  about  the  propriety  of  judicial  review  of  legislative  action.
There  is  no logical necessity  about judicial  review in a federal  system, even
though federalism  of its very nature involves the creation of limited legislative
powers. A further inference  is still necessary  to show that the ordinary courts
have  the  final  "say"  in  determining  whether  legislation  duly  enacted  by a
representative  body  is  ultra vires and  thus  null  and void. Indeed,  there  was
explicit provision in the B.N.A. Act for a political forum  as a possible vehicle
for  enforcing  the  federal  limitations.  This  was  the  provision  for  dominion
disallowance of dominion statutes. However, the constitutional conventions  of
the British Empire  in  1867 prevented  the question  even  from  arising in the
20Probably the best recent treatment of the origins of judicial review under the B.N.A.
Act is Strayer, supra, note 6, ch. 1.
21See  the comment  of Sir  John  A.  MacDonald,  quoted  in Strayer,  supra, note  6
at 15-16.
22 (1803), 5  U.S.  137.
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Canadian legal environment as to whether the existence  of an explicit, political
avenue for review excluded the implicit, judicial alternative3P
Given this fundamental  assumption about the legal  rationale of judicial
review,  certain  further  implications  seemed  natural.  The  first  corollary  is
that any ordinary citizen  who is affected  by the operation of allegedly invalid
statutes  should have standing to  require  that the  Court adjudicate  upon  his
claim to  unconstitutionality.  If  a statute  is sought to  be  applied  to  him,  he
should be able to impugn the validity of the statute by appealing to the more
fundamental  law  defining  the  competence  of  the  enacting  body.  A  second
corollary  deals  with  the  question  of  whether  constitutional  powers  are
exclusive  or  concurrent. The  notion  that  there  is  a  basic  law  setting  out
spheres  of legislative  jurisdiction  suggests  strongly  that the  courts  may hold
legislation  invalid  because  it  encroaches  on  the  constitutional  authority  of
another jurisdiction,  even where  the  latter has  not passed  inconsistent  legis-
lation, or perhaps had not occupied any  part of  the field  at all.  What if the
competent  legislatures have not only refrained from exercising their exclusive
powers but have  also  granted  permission  to  the  other legislatures  to  act  as
they did?  A  third logical  corollary  of the  constitutionality  of judicial  review
in classical federalism  is  that such delegation is impossible. It offends  against
the principle  that  the basic constitutional  law is  the source  of a limited  and
subordinate  authority  in the  legislatures,  and  they  are not  entitled,  even  by
mutual  agreement,  to  amend the  original legal scheme  which belongs  to the
people  (or at least  to  their surrogate,  the courts).
This view of the source of judicial review within our federal constitution
and  its legal  corollaries  is  internally  coherent  and was  originally  plausible.
I suggest, though,  that later developments  have lessened considerably the case
which  can  be  made  in  defence  of  judicial  review  at  the  same  time  as  the
institution  has  become  even  more  solidly  entrenched.2 4
In fact, the  course of events  in  Canada may be symptomatic  of logical
tendencies  in  any federal system.25 In the first place,  why are federal unions
created?  The reason  is that the constituent units face the  need for merger-
usually  because  of  an  external  threat -but  cannot  accept  total  legislative
unity. Political, economic,  social and cultural concerns  are simply too divisive.
Hence  the  constitution-makers  strike  a  political  compromise  and  divide up
the various  governmental functions in a way which best serves these opposing
interests in unity and diversity.
At the time of the merger there is great appeal in the view that the written
bargain is  really a fundamental law,  and  that it has  a sufficient  core of legal
23 "The constitutional law of the Empire in  1867 apparently embraced the convention
that where legislative powers were  granted subject to limitations the courts would enforce
these limitations. The B.N.A.  Act was drafted anid enacted in this  context". Strayer, supra,
note 6 at S.
24The  Statute  of Westminster  (1931)  which  removed  from  Canadian  legislatures
the basic disability of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, had to make an  explicit exception
(by Sec.  7(1),  (3))  for the  British North America  Act's  distributing legislative  power  in
order to preserve the legal basis for judicial review.
25 An  excellent  study  in  the  comparative  politics  of  federalism  is  W. H.  Riker,
Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston:  Little,  Brown,  1964).
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meaning  to be  left to  the administration  of  the  ordinary courts,  even  at  the
behest of the private individual.  Why is  this  so?  First, the  negotiators  of the
federal union have been able to canvass  the governmental  functions  which are
important at that time, and to reach  a decision  about the body to which  they
are  to be  allocated.  The language  which  is  used  to  describe  these  functions
is likely to be fairly accurate, and in any event, there is a sufficient  substratum
of common  understanding  and  practice  to  admit  of  coherent  and  objective
interpretation  even in the  difficult marginal  cases.  Secondly,  the very  reasons
for the creation of a federal (and only a federal) union in the first place require
an impartial  arbiter to  administer these controls. The  original federal bargain
reflected  important  and divisive  interests  in  allocating  some  functions  to the
central  government  while  protecting  local  autonomy  with  respect  to  other
legislative  activities.  These  needs  continue  to  be  deeply  felt  during the  time
that the institutions of the new federal union  develop  authority  and support,
and an impartial  arbiter is  a necessary  source  of  assurance  that  the  original
bargain  is  being  adhered  to.
Each  of  these  conditions  for  the  "law-like"  character  of  a  federal
constitution  gradually  erodes  as  the  document  ages.  There  are  two  related
reasons  for this  tendency:  first, social  change  eventually renders  most of the
original  federal  bargain outmoded;  secondly,  a constitution  of its very nature
is  difficult  to  amend.  There are  several kinds  of  changes  which  are  relevant
to a federal constitution. The original functions which were explicitly allocated
by  the  draftsman  substantially  change  their  character  in  ways  which  are
significant  to  their  proper  distribution.26  New  social  problems  arise  and
demand legislative  responses  which  were  not foreseen by the  draftsman,  and
thus must be dealt with in terms  of the residuary clauses in  the constitution.27
The governmental  units  themselves  change their  character  and capacities  for
legislative  action,  both  positively  and  negatively.28  Fundamental  values  in
society change so that the principles  which shaped the original federal bargain
are  altered.29  The  cumulative  result  of  all  these  tendencies  is  that,  to  the
largest  area  of  constitutional  decision-making,  the  original  written  under-
standing becomes  simply irrelevant  to  the real human  and  social issues  with
which governments  must deal.
On the other hand,  as I have said,  amendment  of a federal  constitution
is  necessarily  difficult,  and  the  Canadian  experience  certainly  verifies  this.3o
26 A  good example  in  this  category  is  the growth  of  the rehabilitative  ideal  in  the
criminal law, which gave rise to the difficult problem of the constitutionality of the federal
Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970,  c. J-3 in A.-G.  of B.C. v. Smith,  [1967]  S.C.R. 702.
27 An illustration of this category is the device of orderly marketing of farm products,
which  has  been  the  subject  of the  cases  discussed  earlier,  culminating  in  the Manitoba
Egg Reference.
28 One can contrast the move of Quebec into the international arena with the problems
of a tiny province like Prince Edward Island in the modem world.
29 Among  these  important  new  values  I  would  include  the  equalization  of social
security  protections  in  different  regions,  the nationalization  of basic  freedoms,  and  the
trend  toward  positive  economic  (as  well  as  the  older  cultural)  activity  of  the  French-
Canadian majority in Quebec.
30 There  have  been only three  explicit  amendments  to  the distribution of legislative
power under the  B.N.A.  Act in  over  one  hundred  years,  and  these  occurred  only  with
respect to the ambit of Dominion power over social security.
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There  are a number of parties  to the bargain,  they  have important  conflicts
of  interest,  and  conventionally  now  they  must  unanimously  agree  on  any
explicit  change.  Not  only  is  it  politically  difficult  to  secure  constitutional
amendments,  but  the perception  of  this  difficulty  exacerbates  the  problem.
If everyone  knows  that an  amendment  is,  practically  speaking,  almost irre-
vocable,  it becomes  much more difficult to persuade  a jurisdiction to concede
certain  constitutional  powers  for  immediate  reasons,  when  the  long-term
significance  of  the  change  is  necessarily  unforeseeable.  Finally,  the  longer
the document remains  unchanged,  the easier  it is  for those who  are opposed
to specific amendments  to appeal to the constitution's  symbolic  and tradition-
laden character.
In such  a legal situation,  it  is  not  defensible for  a court  to  say  that  its
only function is to apply the "law"  as it is written and, if the proper authorities
do not  amend  the  constitution  to  keep  it  in  tune  with  changes  in  society,
the  resultant  misfit is  not  the  responsibility  of  the  judges.  This  attitude  is
founded  on the  pseudo-positivist  assumption  that  the  "law"  inheres  in the
conventional linguistic meaning of the words used in a document and remains
"there"  unaltered,  waiting  to  be  applied  by  a  later  judge  whatever  be  the
changes  in the  social context  into  which he  is to  insert it.  On  the contrary,
I believe  it is  impossible to  separate  the meaning  of a legal proposition from
the context of the procedure in which it was originally  enacted,  the  demands
of the situation  within  which it was  created,  and  the  purposes  or intentions
of those who  drafted  it.31  Only by reference  to  these  elements  does  a  judge
arrive  at a meaningful interpretation  of the content  of the rules  which  he is
legitimately required  to administer. As this content recedes  into insignificance
because of the growing dichotomy between the frozen  constitutional  language
and the rapidly changing society,  a court inevitably begins  to  elaborate a new
constitutional  law in  the course  of  adjudicating  about  novel  and  unforeseen
problems.  This  is  the  objective  import  of  the  court's  work,  even  though
judges  may  disguise  their  responsibility - either  from  themselves  or  from
others - through adoption of a very  abstract  and legalistic  reasoning  style.
The major thrust of constitutional  literature in Canada in the last thirty
years  or  so  has  been  built  on  this  insight  into  judicial  responsibility  for
constitutional  innovation.  Writers  have been concerned  not  only  to  describe
the  nature and  extent  of judicial  alteration  of our federal  structure  but also
to  articulate  the  factors  which  ought  to  influence  the  court  in  allocating
legislative  power  to  one  jurisdiction  or  another.  As  Professor  Lederman
has  so  aptly  put  it,  constitutional  cases  require  the  court  to  answer  the
question,  "Who is the better physician  [for a social problem] - the Domin-
ion  or  Provincial  governments?"3 2  What  triggered  this  appreciation  of  the
true  nature  of  constitutional  decision-making  was  a  series  of  unfortunate
judicial  decisions  in the inter-war period, more  than a half century  after the
birth of the Canadian  constitution.
31 "A word is not a  crystal,  transportation  and  unchanged;  it is  the  skin of  a living
thought and may vary greatly  in colour  and content  according  to the  circumstances  and
the times  in  which it is used."  Mr. Justice Holmes  in Towne v. Eisner (1918),  245 U.S.
418 at 425.
32Lederman,  Thoughts on Reform of the Supreme Court of Canada (1970),  8 Alta.
L. Rev. 1 at 4.
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These  cases  dealt with  challenges  to  some  radically  different  legislative
schemes,  which were  not within  the  experience  of  those  who  were  drafting
the specific  categories  of the B.N.A.  Act,  and thus  had  to be  classified  by
the Court  in  terms of  the general or residual  clauses  of the  document.  Not
only  did  this  process  place  more  onerous  technical  demands  on  the court
than  it  had  been  accustomed  to  in  its  earlier  period  of  more  genuine
interpretation  but  it  graphically  showed  how  the  process  of  federal  alloca-
tion can be  distorted  by judicial  lack  of familiarity  with,  or sympathy  for,
the policies  imbedded  in  new  statutes.33 In any  event,  the  courts  produced
a series of decisions  whose total impact  was a constitutional  straitjacket  that
prevented an adequate political response  to Canadian social needs.  There was
a  strong  consensus  among  constitutional  writers  that  these  cases  had  to be
either  over-ruled  or ignored.  Yet  this  meant  that  in the  very  areas  where
judicial review was faced with vital and controversial  issues, the growing legal
inadequacy  of  the constitutional  document  was not  remedied  by the articu-
lation of  stable judicial  authorities  and principles.  However,  the  recognition
of  judicial  responsibility  for  constitutional  choices,  and the  hope  for  new
directions  in constitutional  policy, led to  the call for final  appellate authority
in the Supreme Court of Canada. The expectation was that a Canadian court,
composed  of  Canadian  judges,  might  produce  a  higher  quality  of  judicial
adaptation  to  social  change - especially  since  these  judges  would  have  to
live in the same society whose political institutions they were helping to mould.
A  second  theme  in  our  constitutional  literature has  now  emerged  and
is founded on this frank recognition of judicial responsibility for constitutional
change.  The  natural question to  ask  is  whether  our courts - especially the
Supreme  Court of Canada-  are institutionally  equipped  to  make  the judg-
ments  required for rational  policy-making.  It is  easy  to  see why lawyers  are
attracted to the notion of  constitutional  reform  through judicial  change. It is
legally possible  to assert  that the court is  merely engaged  in adjudication  of
new  situations,  that the  decisions  are  available  as  of right  and are  authori-
tative, and that changes can be spaced out in an orderly and incremental  way.
Yet real difficulties  emerge  as the courts  try to perform the task and we begin
to realize that they are performing it. Recognition of these  difficulties  has led
to  important  recent  proposals  for  the  redesign  of  the  Supreme  Court  to
improve  its constitutional  performance.
Our first concern  may be with the quality  of judge-made  constitutional
policy.  There  are  two  important  requirements  for  intelligent  policy-making:
the decision-maker must be apprised  of the  relevant data, and he must have
the kind of background  and expertise  which  enables  him to assess  the data
intelligently.  The adversary process  of adjudication, though it may be an apt
instrument for developing a true picture of a specific  event, is hardly the way
to  portray  the  complex  and  ambiguous  character  of  a  changing  Canadian
society  in  a way  relevant  to the  demands  of federalism.  If  a constitutional
issue is raised collaterally in actual litigation, the judge gets some idea of how
his decision will affect real-life relationships  but there is a great risk that this
picture will be biased by the fact that he sees only the abnormal case that went
33 A fine study of the constitutional performance  of the courts in this era is Mallory,
Social Credit and the Federal  Power (1954).
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to court.  In a reference  case,  he is  saved  from this  danger,  but only  at  the
expense of being completely  lost in an  abstract judicial  world.
Nor can we seek the answer in judicial notice of the relevant facts by wise
and statesmanlike  men  appointed to the  Court. Judges  are recruited  from a
very  narrow stratum  of society -middle-aged  and respectable  lawyers-  a
practice  which  is  justified  on  the ground  that we  want  courts to adjudicate
specific  disputes  within a  framework of law. It is only by accident that men
picked for this purpose will be able to perform the  special and rather esoteric
function  of  federalism  (which,  after  all,  is  only  a  small  percentage  of  the
court's decision-making  function.)  Nor are they likely to  become educated  in
the realities  and  necessities  of government  in a federation by  the haphazard
and accidental  character  of -the  litigation  which happens  to  move  them into
action.
Various  structural  changes  have  been  suggested.34  One  is  the  deletion
or downgrading of the private law function of the Supreme Court. This would
supposedly free the Court for further exposure to and education in the policy-
laden questions of public law. It might also justify the appointment  of people
without  an  emphasis  on narrow  legal  expertise.  It has  also  been  suggested
that use of extrinsic  aids  (such as  Brandeis  briefs)  will  enhance  the  judges'
appreciation of the relevant alternatives and better enable  the Court to judge
between  them.  Perhaps  the  most  fundamental  revision  advocated  in  this
direction is -the removal of  constitutional  decision-making  from  the ordinary
courts of law, and  the creation  of  a specialized  constitutional  tribunal.  The
tribunal could be composed of non-lawyers  as well as lawyers,  and presumably
could also be equipped for and charged with the task  of making independent
investigations  of  the  direction  in  which  Canadian  constitutionalism  should
proceed.
Before  assessing  these  proposals,  I  would  first trace  the  other  line  of
criticism  of  the  present  structure  of  the  Supreme  Court  and  show  how  it
connects up also with the suggestion  of a constitutional court. It is not enough
that constitutional decisions be well researched and reasoned, and be produced
by our constitutional  experts.  The apparent  surface authority  of our law and
of legal decisions  depends on  a broad-based  consensus  about the  legitimacy
of the body which  produces  them. Absent  such  a consensus  and it will not
be long before the losers will be loath to accept  voluntarily the decisions that
go against them. Unfortunately, when judicial responsibility  for constitutional
innovation is  made evident,  and commendably  so,  its legitimacy  must  soon
come into  question. It is one thing to justify judicial  review on the  grounds
that there is a supreme law, agreed upon at the founding of the nation,  which
34 Important contributions  to  the literature  about  the design  of the Supreme  Court
include:  Abel,  The Role of the Supreme Court in Private Law  Cases (1965),  4 Alta.
L. Rev.  35; Morin, A  Constitutional Court for Canada (1965),  43  Can.  Bar  Rev.  545;
LeDain,  Concerning the  Proposed Constitutional and Civil Law  Specialization at the
Supreme Court Level (1967),  Revue Juridique Th6mis  107; Strayer, supra, note 5; Russell,
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (1968).  6  Osgoode  Hall Law Journal  1;  Russell,
Constitutional  Reform of the Canadian  Judiciary  (1968-69),  7 Alta. Law Rev. 103; Morin,
Le  Qudbec et rArbitrage Constitutionnel (1967),  45  Can.  Bar  Rev.  608;  McWhinney,
"A Supreme  Court  in  a Bicultural  Society"  in  Ontario Advisory  Committee on Con-
federation  (1967).
1973]OSGOODE  HALL  LAW  JOURNAL
must be  applied by the  Courts  in  evaluating  the  legality  of the  enactments
which these subordinate  institutions  have produced.  It is  quite  another thing
to justify judicial  review when  it is  seen for what it really is - a continuous
process  of  constitutional  development  and  evaluation  which  is  used by  the
courts to strike down legislation enacted by the democratic  and representative
institutions  in our society.
The reason  why  continual  judicial  innovation  is necessary  is  that con-
stitutional amendment is so difficult to achieve.  The reason why constitutional
amendment  is so difficult  is  that any revision  of  legislative  authority involves
vital,  unforeseeable,  and  almost  irrevocable  alterations  of  political  power.
As  a result, the interested parties  can rarely  agree  on explicit  changes.  Yet,
if this  is  the nature  of  constitutional  amendments,  it is  difficult  to  see  why
such changes  will  be  any more acceptable  when  they are  unilaterally  imple-
mented by the Courts.  The only way  that political institutions  can live  with
this  possibility, once  they perceive  its existence,  is  to attempt to  gain  control
over  the court which  is  making the  decisions.
Within  this  perspective  the  Supreme  Court of  Canada  exhibits  a basic
flaw.  The source of an  umpire's  authority is  his  impartiality,  which  assumes
his lack of  special  dependence  on  any  one  side.  However,  the  members  of
the  present  Court  are  all  picked  by  the  federal  government  which  has  an
unfettered  discretion  in evaluating  their  competence  and attitudes. Moreover,
the  Constitution  does  not  guarantee  the  status  of  either  the  Court  or  its
members after they are selected.  Instead, the judges are all paid and protected
in their  tenure  under  a statute  which  is  within  the  sole  legislative  authority
of the federal parliament. Legally  speaking,  the impartiality  of the umpire  of
federalism  may be said to exist  at the sufferance of one side to these  disputes.
It has been the contribution  of French-Canadian  analysis  since the Tremblay
Report  to  point this  out  and to  call  for the  necessary  changes.  Those who
favour  a fundamentally  different  "constitutional  court"  propose  that such  a
body  should  have  a  constitutionally  entrenched  status  and tenure  and  that
its  members  should  be  selected  proportionately  by  both  the  federal  and
provincial  governments.
Let me summarize  this  very simplified  sketch  of the intellectual  history
of judicial review in Canada.  Judicial  review was originally  justified in terms
of the duty of the ordinary courts to  apply all the relevant  law in  the adjudi-
cation  of  concrete  disputes in  Canada. In particular this  required  measuring
the subordinate Canadian  statute against the terms  of the more basic British
law which had legally created the limited law-making powers in the first place.
After a period of time (fifty years or so) social and political changes  rendered
the specific sections of the frozen constitution largely  obsolete, and the  courts
were required to base their decisions  on the vague residuary clauses.  Criticism
of the  content  of  these  decisions,  and  the  constitutional  strait  jacket  which
they appeared  to place on the  Canadian political  structure, led  to  a  call  for
a much less legalistic and  more policy-oriented  view  of the judicial  function
in Canadian  federalism. It was not long, though, before it was recognized that
the Supreme Court of Canada - designed  as it was for the job of adjudication
- was  not really  capable  of  meeting  the  demands  of constitutional  policy-
making. Yet, as  the proposal  emerged  for the redesign  of the  Court for the
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better performance  of  its  constitutional function,  the institution  which  finally
emerges  as ideal  is a body which is not really  a court at all.
In the course  of this  sustained intellectual  critique of  judicial  review-
of the way it is and should be  carried on - the  one question  which  is never
asked is the most fundamental  of all. Should we continue to have any judicial
review  at all in Canadian  federalism? 3 5  As I have said,  the original rationale
for review  was in terms  of the ordinary  courts  applying a law. However,  the
contemporary  reality,  as  reflected  in  the Manitoba Reference,  is  that  there
is  no longer a  meaningful law  to  apply  and  the present  function  of  federal
umpiring  appears unsuited for the  adversary process  of the  ordinary courts.
If I may put  the matter  a little  more bluntly  than did Mr. Justice  Hughes,
current judicial review in the Supreme  Court of Canada means that  the Court
is  holding  legislation  valid or  invalid  on the  basis  of  standards  which  it is
making up as  it goes along.  If this is  indeed true,  we must  seriously ponder
whether our constitutional structure has outgrown  the role of judicial umpire.
Obviously  I  cannot  demonstrate  my  thesis  about  the  lack  of  law in
Canadian  federalism  decisions  from  one  case  and  I  cannot  in  this  lecture
document  my  view  that  the  Manitoba Reference  is  a  typical  example.36
However,  my review  of  all the constitutional  cases  in the Supreme  Court  of
Canada since 1949 has suggested two pronounced trends. First, the substantive
direction  of  the Court's  constitutional  policy  is  in favour  of a  gradual  and
sensible widening of the ambit  for legislative  action.  This  is  particularly  the
case  for  the  federal  Parliament  which  the  Court-  in  deed  though  not in
word - no longer attempts  to restrict in  any significant  way. As regards the
provincial  legislatures,  while  the trend  has been less marked,  there has been
a  relaxation  of  judicial  control  in  the  sixties.  The  Court  still  intervenes
occasionally - if  only to  remind  everyone  that it  still has  the  last word.
The  cases in which the Court does intervene and tries to draw a negative
constitutional line,  exhibit the  second  pronounced  trend. This  is  the  Court's
inability to articulate any general principle  which shows why some provincial
statutes are valid and others  are not. For example,  the Supreme  Court simply
did not apply to the facts of the Manitoba  Reference any legal standard which
could  fairly  be  said  to  have  controlled  the  decision  in  Carnation Milk,37
though  the  legal  and  functional  problems  presented  by the  cases  are  very
similar. I am no great admirer  of the  reasoning style  of the  Supreme  Court
of Canada  and its continued  failure to  articulate  legal rules  and  distinctions.
However,  I do believe there is something about the subject-matter itself which
35 1 have  found only two  sustained analyses  of this  basic question  in the Canadian
literature:  Clokie,  Judicial Review,  Federalism, and the  Canadian Constitution (1942),
8  Can.  Journal  of Economics  and  Political  Science  537;  Mallory,  The  Courts and the
Sovereignty of  the  Canadian Parliament (1944),  10  Can.  Journal  of  Economics  and
Political Science  165.
361  have  attempted  to do  so in  an  article reviewing  all  the federalism  cases in  the
Supreme  Court of  Canada  since  1950, which  will  appear  in  a forthcoming  issue  of  the
University of Toronto Law Journal.
37 These  cases  deal  with state  legislation  placing  allegedly  unconstitutional  burdens
on state commerce.  See Benson, supra, note  18,  Part 3. A typical critical  comment  about
the Court's  inability to articulate  any viable  legal  standards  is  in  Freund,  The Supreme
Court of the United States (Cleveland, World Pub. Co.,  1961)  at 99-100.
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accounts  for  much  of  the  inadequacy  of  our  constitutional  opinions.  For
example,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  this  same  area  of
federalism also  no longer  tries to  restrict  the national  government  and  even
its admirers  are unimpressed  by the reasoning in the few opinions which  still
try to control  the statutes. When  a court is  working with  a document which
is at least  a century  old,  which  cannot be  amended  to deal  with  completely
new  legislative  issues,  and  is  required  to  allocate  political  power  to  one
question-begging  verbal  category  or another, how  does it justify  its  conclu-
sion? It is easy to support a conclusion in favour of the validity of immediate
legislation  because  it is  invariably  the case  that each  jurisdiction  has  some
legitimate  reasons for acting in the area.  However  if one  seeks  to  invalidate
challenged  legislation  on the  grounds  that the other jurisdiction  has  a  com-
pelling  claim to exclusive  control,  what standards  or principles  are  available
which  can  resolve  the  essentially  political  controversy?38  To  the  outsider,
constitutional adjudication resembles  nothing so much as compulsory,  interest-
dispute, labour arbitration, and is  equally devoid  of legal  standards.
The analogy  with compulsory arbitration  is instructive. Ordinarily,  if an
issue is politically charged and there are no established legal standards which
are applicable  to it, we do not believe  it can be satisfactorily  resolved by  an
adjudicative  body  such as a  court (or  an  arbitration  board.)  Yet sometimes
the  political  (or bargaining)  process  is  not a viable  alternative  and judicial
intervention is  better than nothing.39 I do believe  that federalism  cases (such
as  the Manitoba Reference) involve  essentially  non-legal conflicts  which will
not be  dealt with  very successfully  in the  judicial  process,  and thus  courts
should avoid the area unless  their intervention  is absolutely vital. I  must still
address  the  question  whether  a  federal  system - in  particular,  Canadian
federalism - really does  need a judicial  umpire  to  survive  in an acceptable
way.
The lawyer's  natural  response is,  "of course,  we need  a federal  umpire
because  how  else  will  we  resolve  conflicts  between  different  governments,
when  each believes  it has a distinctive legislative  claim in a particular  area?"
One  of the most basic  tenets  of the lawyer's  ideology is that where  there is
conflict, there must be a neutral and authoritative body -preferably  a court
- which can render a decision to resolve the conflict. If there is no procedure
for  making  binding  decisions  about  disputed issues  and  thus  enforcing  the
rules  against  those  who  are  tempted  to  non-compliance,  one  may  wonder
how the legal system or any part of it could long survive. Yet further reflection
should  suggest  that law  without  judges-  in  particular,  federalism  without
an umpire - is at least possible,  if not probable  and desirable. Who  has not
38An  apt  recent  example  is  the  controversy  about  provincial  control  of  cable
television,  especially  in  the  educational  or  cultural  sphere.  The  legal  background  is
reviewed  in Atkey,  "The  Provincial  Interest  in  Broadcasting  under  the  Canadian  Con-
stitution"  in  The Confederation Challenge, Vol.  2  (1970).  The  responsible  minister  in
Quebec,  Jean-Paul  L'Allier, has  indicated  that  he  would not feel  bound  by a Supreme
Court adjudication in this novel and murky area. (See Toronto Globe and Mail, November
27, 1971,  at 10).
39 Administration of a Bill  of Rights may be an example, especially  in certain  areas
such as due process. I am analyzing this issue in depth in another article, and mention it
here to make clear that I do not feel restriction of judicial review in the sphere of federalism
is inconsistent with the expansion of the judicial role in protecting civil liberties.
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played  in a  game  which  has  successfully  been  carried  on  within  the  rules
but in the absence  of an umpire?  Further,  the  plausibility  of the role  of the
court  as  an umpire of our federal rules  must be substantially lessened  when
we fully appreciate the fact that the court is developing the rules of the game
as it goes  along. Constitutional  conflict  is not  always  so bad and,  even when
it  is,  I  doubt  that judicial  review  can  make  a  durable  contribution  to  its
resolution.
Instead, it  seems  to  me that  a  federal  system  is  precisely  the  kind  of
relationship for which an  external umpire may not be necessary and in which
the  better  technique  for  managing  conflict  is  continual  negotiation  and
political  compromise.  In  fact,  Canadian  federalism  exhibits  many  of  the
conditions  which are highly conducive to bargaining. There is a small number
of governments; they  are constantly talking to each other; they are dependent
on each  other's  co-operation  in many  different  areas;  there  is  always  room
for trading in new or recurring problem  areas,  and  they are quite  capable of
spending  the  time  and  energy  to  formulate  a  compromise.  Occasionally,
perhaps,  an issue may arise in which compromise appears impossible because
neither side can make any concession from its vital interests. However,  this is
precisely the area where unilateral imposition of a settlement by an unrespon-
sive body  such  as  the  Supreme  Court  will  be  equally  unacceptable.  It  will
require  the further  techniques  of  political bargaining  to  secure  the  effective
implementation  of the judicial decision in  any event.
It  is  sometimes  suggested  that,  in  the  more  typical  and  less  critical
issues  which  might  be  resolved  by  compromise,  the  process  of  bargaining
will be enhanced by the presence  in the background of a neutral umpire who
could  provide  an  authoritative  ruling  in  the  case  of  disagreement.  If  the
experience  in the labour area is any indication the contrary  is  true and there
is a real possibility that the availability of the judicial alternative may actually
hinder  the  achievement  of  more  functional  solutions  through  compromise.
The aura which  surrounds  courts  tends  to  convert  real  but limited  conflicts
of  interest into  an  artificial  controversy  over  basic  principles. Adjudicative
responses to  a dispute ordinarily  speak of absolute  legal rights - enjoyed by
one  party  and  not  the  other - rather  than  recognizing  each  has  political
claims  of  varying  weight.  Negotiations  are  usually  more  productive  in  an
atmosphere  where  somewhat  ambiguous  claims  may  be  gracefully  conceded,
one  in return  for another,  rather  than one  side  having  to  give  up its  rights
which are  guaranteed it by the court.4
Hence, I suggest that as lawyers we must take a new view of the process
of constitutional policy-making,  a view which emphasizes  the political charac-
ter  of  these  issues  and  their  awkward  fit  with  adjudication.  There  is  good
reason  to believe  that the  original  participants  of  Confederation  assumed  a
high degree of political interdependence which would deal with federal conflicts
through  these  resources,  and  the  tacit  assumption  that  judicial  review  was
merely  residual.  The legalistic  cost  to  Canadian  constitutionalism  may  have
40 For  this  reason,  it  is  particularly  unfortunate  that  matters  are  referred  to  the
courts  for a "legal"  decision  in  the midst of  ongoing  negotiations.  A  classic example  of
this is the Offshore Oil Reference, [1967]  S.C.R. 792, which  is criticized  in McWhinney,
Federal Supreme  Courts and Constitutional  Review  (1967),  45  Can.  Bar  Rev.  578  at
599-600.
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been appropriate  in our earlier  years  as  a  nation. However,  both  the federal
and provincial governments  have matured  along with  the rest of our society
to  an extent that makes  the  categories  of  exclusive,  self-contained  legislative
functions  no longer  tenable.  We  must allow  the  representative  governments
to  decide  not  only  whether  affirmative  legislative  action  is  desirable  for  a
social  problem  but  also  whether  it  is  the  appropriate  body  to  enact  such
legislation.  The court  should not have  the job  of making  the  latter, equally
political,  decision.
It is  no doubt possible, even likely,  that both  the federal and provincial
governments  would decide  that they  should act  and  that joint  occupancy  of
the field would be awkward. However,  this is a reason why the two competing
jurisdictions  should  negotiate  a  solution  whereby  one  agrees  to retreat  and
let the other have full sway. Such arrangements would be devised by reference
to guidelines  drawn  from earlier  patterns  of legislative  behaviour,  reciprocal
concessions,  threats of sanctions,  and the  usual paraphernalia  of political (or
other) bargaining  and compromise.  It is  true that sometimes  a governmental
consensus  may not emerge  and citizens  who  are subject  to  two  sets  of laws
with  somewhat  uncoordinated  policies  will  find  this  rather  uncomfortable.
What should be  the role of our courts  in this situation and how is it relevant
to my main proposal? First of all, it is a minimum demand on a legal system -
if not  of  its  logic,  at least  of  its  "internal  morality" - that  citizens  not be
subjected  to  contradictory  laws,  and  courts  must  have  the  power  to  refine
the administration of the legal order to prevent this situation  arising. Even in
a unitary legal system, there are potential  cases of legal conflict because of the
existence  of  multiple  decision-makers  in  any  complex  society.  The  courts  in
such a society are  required to  play  the narrower  (though  still  vital)  judicial
role of interpretation of the relevant statutes to  avoid legal  conflicts and  then
application of doctrines of paramountcy to resolve the few remaining situations
of unavoidably  contradictory legal rules. Undoubtedly  the courts  in a federal
system must also perform this function and  no doubt it will  arise even more
often because  of the very  nature of federalism.
On the other hand, I do realize the possibility that the courts  can become
almost  as involved  in the politics  of federalism,  through the apparently  more
limited  vehicle  of  paramountcy  than  they  would  be  when  assessing  the
validity  of laws  enacted  under exclusive  legislative  powers.  The  corollary  of
my general thesis about the role of courts in a federal system is that the scope
of judicial action  in this sphere should be confined  to the same range as  in a
unitary legal system. Where a court sees  that there are two statutes  apparently
relevant  to  one factual  situation,  it must  first  interpret  the  meaning  of the
statutes  to  see  whether  each  is  really  applicable.  Only  if  this  results  in  an
inescapable  contradiction of legal directives,  should the court proceed to hold
one  of these  to  be inoperative.
41
41 My  review  of  the  federalism  cases  in  the Supreme  Court  in  the  last  20  years
suggest  that this  happens  only  rarely,  as it did  in A.-G.  of  British Columbia v.  Smith,
[1967] S.C.R. 702, and A.-G. of Ontario  v. Policy Holders of Wentworth Insurance Com-
pany et al.,  [1969]  S.C.R. 779. The extent to which  the courts  can use  interpretation  to
avoid  apparent  conflict  is  well-illustrated  in  cases  such  as  Re  Validity  of  Sec.  92(4),
Vehicles Act,  1957 (Sask.),  [1958]  S.C.R.  910,  and  Fawcett v.  A.-G.  of  Ontario and
A.-G.  of Canada,  [1964]  S.C.R. 625.
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An  appropriately  restricted  judicial role  would not  allow  for the  appli-
cation  of vague  doctrines  of  "occupying  the  field"  or  "pre-emption"  to  find
"implied"  conflicts  when  two  legislatures  have  each  tried  to  deal  with  the
same problem.42
Where  the  solutions  adopted  by  the  two  legislatures  are  not  legally
contradictory  then,  even  though  the court  believes  the legislative  policies  to
be  somewhat  incompatible,  it  should  leave  it  to  the  legislatures  to  take
responsibility for creating an explicit  conflict and thus  invoking  the doctrines
of paramountcy  (and facing the  electorate for the results,  whatever they may
be.)  The only possible exception  to this logic might be the case  of  provincial
laws burdening inter-provincial trade, and thus harming the economic interests
of  the  citizens  in  other  provinces  to  whom  the  legislating  province  is  not
electorally  responsible.  My own view  is that the  only limitation on provincial
laws  in  this  area  should  be  a  prohibition  on  discrimination  against  extra-
provincial  citizens  or products.  Absent  a finding  of  such  discrimination,  the
federal  government  should  have  the  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  decide  that
provincial  laws  are  an  undue  interference  with  the national  market.43
The key  remaining  question  concerns  the  content  of  the  paramountcy
doctrines  which should be adopted  in  a federal  system where  the role  of the
courts is to be minimized. The natural  conclusion is that there should be one
easily applicable  rule, singling  out one  jurisdiction's  legislation  as  dominant.
There  seems  also  no  doubt  that,  if  such  is  the  character  of  the  rule,  the
dominant jurisdiction  must be the Dominion  Parliament,  which is responsive
to the whole  electorate, including  voters  in the province  whose legislation  is
being overridden.  The argument  will be made,  of  course,  that this gives  the
national  government  the legal  power  to  erode  the federal  system  through  a
gradual process  of self-aggrandizement.  My response  is that  legal possibility
does  not  equal  political  feasibility  and  that  we  can  and  must  rely  on  the
political constraints of the federal system to ensure that this does not happen.44
How  effective  is  the  political  process  likely  to  be  as  an  alternative  to
judicial  review  in  resolving  lack  of  co-ordination  in  legislative  regulation?
I  believe  that  one  of  the  reasons  why  we  may  be  reluctant  to  trust  the
political  agencies  to  do  this  job  is  the  very  existence  of  judicial  review  as
an alternative  and ultimately  authoritative  decision-maker.  This  has diverted
our  attention  from  the  need  to  devise  machinery  which  can  do  this  job.
However,  there are important lessons  to be learned from two  areas of Cana-
dian  federalism  where  judicial  review  is  almost  completely  non-existent:
(i) control of the economy through monetary and  fiscal policies;  (ii)  the pro-
vision of services,  social  security,  welfare, etc. Here  we have no set of legal
rules  dividing  up  the  exercise  of  governmental  power,  administered  and
enforced  by the  courts  from  the  outside.  Instead,  there  is  the  superficially
"messy" situation  of freedom for experiment  and initiative  which  often gives
42 These American  or Australian  doctrines have  not  found favour in  Canada,  as the
Supreme  Court decision  in Mann v. The Queen, [1966]  S.C.R. 238  illustrates.
43This  is essentially the position  of Mr. Justice Black in  the United States Supreme
Court; see discussion in Benson, supra, note 18.
44See  Wechsler,  The Political Safeguards of  Federalism (1954),  54  Columbia  L.
Rev. 543.
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rise  to  conflicts  of  policy.  However,  as  a  result,  a  conventional  framework
has been developed  within the federal constitution  to co-ordinate the concrete
policies as  they are developed.  This seems a much more fruitful exercise than
attempting to define  exclusive, abstract, and permanent areas  of governmental
jurisdictions.45 There  is  no reason  to  suppose  that, with  the  withdrawal  of
judicial  review  from  the  field,  the  same  process  would  not  be repeated  in
the sphere of legal regulation. In fact, I believe that we are much more likely
to  achieve  a satisfactory  atmosphere  for consensus  if we  are  striving  merely
for  agreements,  which  can  be  altered  or  revoked,  rather  than  an  over-all
Agreement,  which is  constitutionally  frozen.
My concluding  remarks must bring this discussion back somewhat closer
to the reality  of the Twentieth  Century in Canada. I certainly  do not believe
this proposal  for the  abolition  of judicial  review  will be implemented  for  a
long  time,  if ever.  The  primary  point of  my  analysis  though,  is  to provide
a  framework  for  consideration  of  current  discussion  about  the  procedures
for constitutional  decision-making-  especially  the  proposal  for  a  constitu-
tional court. The real issue now is not whether we should have judicial review
or not, but  rather  how  much  of it  should  we  have  and  how  it should  be
carried  on.  In my  view,  abolition  of  judicial  review  is  the  ideal,  but I  am
more  concerned  with  immediate  practical  steps  towards  minimizing  either
the incidence or the harm from review. Instead of trying to alter the Supreme
Court in ways  designed  to  make it a better  constitutional  umpire, let us try
to  reduce  as  much  as  possible  the  significance  of  this function  in its  work.
The  most important  conclusion  which  is  suggested  by  my  analysis  is
one directed to the Supreme Court itself - the political desirability of judicial
restraint  in the  area of federalism.  In fact, in the last twenty years,  perhaps
for some of the reasons I have suggested, there has been a gradual but marked
relaxation  of the federal  restraints  placed  by the  Court  on our  legislatures.
We can predict some real legislative  tests  of this new judicial  attitude  in the
next twenty years, especially  from some more adventurous  regulatory statutes
from  the federal  Parliament.  If,  as  I hope,  these  statutory  innovations  are
consistently  sustained  against  legislative  attack,  we  might  approach  very
closely  the  functional  abolition  of  judicial  review,  and  simply  through  the
low-visibility,  incremental  process  of judicial  change.
There is  one procedural  change which  would  help  this judicial  retreat,
and which  might  be  politically  feasible  now. It  involves  a  sharp  tightening
of the law of standing to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute.  The
implications of what I suggest are graphically illustrated by the recent Supreme
Court of Canada decision in the Bell Telephone case46 (one of the few  recent
decisions  actually  holding provincial  legislation  to be  invalid,  even in part).
Here  Bell  Telephone  resisted  a  government  suit  for  over  $50,000,  a  levy
which was  imposed under  the Quebec  Minimum Wage  Act on  the  grounds
that  the Act could  not constitutionally  apply  to Bell  Telephone  and its  em-
ployees  because  they were  within the  dominion regulatory  jurisdiction under
45 See Smiley, "Devices  of Adjustment in the Canadian  Constitution",  Constitutional
Adaptation and Canadian Federalism Since 1945 (Ottawa:  Information  Canada,  1970),
ch. 4.
46 Commission du Salaire v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1966]  S.C.R. 767.
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S.  92  (10).  It should  be noted  that  the  constitutionality  of  a  direct  taxing
statute  as  applied to  Bell  could  not have  been  attacked, but the  legality  of
this  administrative  levy  depended  on the  constitutional  validity  of  applying
the general scheme  of the statute to regulate Bell's minimum  wages, maximum
hours,  etc.  The  Court accepted  the  company's  constitutional  argument  and
thus  rejected  the  provincial  government's  monetary  action.
In my view, there is something  wrong with  a legal system  which  allows
a private business  to impeach  in this way  the  validity  of laws  enacted by  a
representative  legislature. The Act had been in existence for a long time and,
along with  similar employment  legislation  (such  as  the  Child  Labour  Act),
had been understood  to  apply to all companies  employing people in  Quebec.
The  federal  government  had  not  enacted  similar  social  legislation  dealing
with  industries within  its own jurisdiction,  and there was  no evidence  that it
had  ever  objected  to  provincial  laws  setting  such  minimum  standards  for
companies  such  as  Bell.  Suddenly,  because  they  are faced  with  a monetary
suit, the company raises  a legal defence  which is not once but twice removed
from  the legitimate interests it has  in the  dispute.  As a result,  the  Supreme
Court responded  with  a ruling which created  a shadowy  enclave  of business
immunity from provincial regulation.47
From the perspective  within  which I view the role  of judicial  review in
constitutional  law, I would  propose that we  not allow  private  individuals  of
their own motion to impeach  the validity of statutes  on the ground that they
infringe the "exclusive"  jurisdiction of another legislative body.48 (By analogy,
we  do  not allow  taxpayers'  suits  or defences  on the  grounds  of  the  alleged
unconstitutionality  of  the  expenditure  of  tax  revenues.)  Hence,  I  would
suggest  that we not  only require  the private  citizen  to  give  notice of a  con-
stitutional  challenge  to the  offending  jurisdiction  (as  we  do  now),  but that
we also require that he obtain  consent for this challenge  from the Attorney-
General of the jurisdiction whose "turf'  he is defending. The only time that a
private  citizen should have a legal claim in his  own  right to a  constitutional
decision is when there are two contradictory statutes from contending jurisdic-
tions  and he  is  asking for the minimal judicial  decision  about paramountcy.
In cases such as Bell Telephone where there is no contlicting legislation,
it  is  obvious  that the  province  had a  legitimate  interest  in the  substance  of
its attempted regulation  of Bell Telephone, even though we might agree  with
the Court that the federal interest was more compelling. If the federal govern-
ment wants to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this area, then it should either
intervene  to  challenge  the  constitutionality  of  the  provincial  law  (or  its
application)  or, better yet,  enact its  own statute implementing the  pattern  of
471  might add  that the Court had two competing legal precedents  and analogies  from
which  to choose,  one  upholding  the application  of provincial  Workmen's  Compensation
legislation  to  these  Dominion industries,  the  other  case  denying  the application  of the
provincial  minimum  wage  legislati6n  in  the  Dominion  postal  service.  Rather  casually
and, I think, incorrectly, the Court opted for the second analogy and  held the employment
standards statute constitutionally inapplicable  to Bell Telephone.  The decision  is sharply
and accurately  criticized  in Gibson, Interjurisdictional  Immunity  in Canadian  Federalism
(1969), Can. Bar Rev. 40 at 53-56.
48 See Strayer, supra,  note 6 at 117-20. A recent case refusing to hear a constitutional
challenge  brought by a taxpayer is  Thorson v. A.-G. of Canada (2), E1972]  1 O.R.  86.
19731OSGOODE  HALL  LAW  JOURNAL
legislation it prefers. Nor should we be deterred by the predictable  response of
the lawyers,  who  will protest that we  are depriving  the private  litigant of his
right to  a judicial examination  of  the validity of a statute  which might  affect
his position in a legal dispute. It makes sense to talk of legal rights only when
there  are  meaningful  legal  rules  imposing  a  legal  obligation  on  one  actor,
and  which  we  then  feel justifies  conferring  on  another  the right  to  enforce
the duty.49 In my view, though,  the process  of constitutional decision-making
in Canada has outgrown  its original legal context,  and the  Supreme  Court is
simply  engaging  in  ad hoc dispute  resolution  (as  typified  in  the  Manitoba
Reference). If the best we can hope for from our judicial umpire is a Delphic
utterance - valid  or invalid - is there really any reason to  allow  the private
litigant  to  consult  the oracle?50
Elimination  of  the  power  of  the  private  citizen  to  lodge  a  unilateral
challenge  to  the  validity  of a statute  on federalism  grounds  would  sharply
lessen the incidence  of judicial review  and  resolution  of constitutional  ques-
tions.51  It would require  the creation  of much more  extensive procedures  for
inter-governmental  consultation in the area of conflicts of regulation. I believe
we  can  assume  that  the  Coughlin 52  case  has  removed  almost  all  of  the
significant limitations  on the power  of governments  to  agree to  alterations of
legislative  power, at least where  administrative  agencies  are  involved  (which
is  the almost invariable  case  in the  area of  legal regulation  in  any  event.) If
this is true, we  can expect  much the same ad hoc consensual  adjustments and
arrangements  in this  area  as  are found  regarding  economic  policy  or  social
security. This will force the interested governments  to face  their own respon-
sibilities  for  the essentially  political  and technical  questions  of  allocation  of
government  responsibility in  such fields  as pollution  control,  wage  and price
regulation,  competitions  policy,  Canadian  economic  nationalism,  etc.  It will
enable  these  decisions  to  be made  in a forum  much more  conducive  to  an
informed and acceptable resolution of the immediate problem,  without undue
fear of a "legal"  or principled  precedent.  If access to judicial review is made
49See  the  analysis  of  the  concept  of  a  legal right  in  Hart  and  Sacks,  The Legal
Process  (Cambridge, Mass.:  1958) at 114 ff.
50 By contrast, Strayer, supra, note 6, favours a widening of the use of judicial review
to settle federalism disputes, in particular by elimination of standing barriers. His proposals
are based on a view of constitutional decision-making which is epitomized in this statement:
"A resort to  the  courts  might clarify the legal position,  so  that attempts  at  a resolution
of such conflicts  could at least proceed on an intelligent basis.  Otherwise the constitution
will be lost sight of in  the welter of federal-provincial  negotiations  constantly in process.
Without a clarification  of the constitutional  position,  many  of  these proceed  on a basis
of political accommodation:  the respective bargaining  strength of the parties  is measured
by popular support, not legal  right. In the process,  the fundamental  values  embodied  in
the  constitutional  division  of powers  may be  completely  overlooked.  A return  to  law  is
now required."
51 However,  the  decline in the  importance  of judicial review  is  well underway,  even
without this change,  for reasons  sketched  in  Corry,  "Constitutional  Trends and  Federal-
ism"  in  Meekison  (ed.),  Canadian Federalism: Myth  and Reality  (Toronto,  London:
Methuen,  1968) at 51-64.
52Coughlin v.  Ontario Highway Transport Board, [1968]  S.C.R.  569.  The  dissent
in this  case is  the best authority for the  specious  distinction  the majority  were trying to
draw from the Nova Scotia Inter-delegation  Reference, [1951]  S.C.R. 31,  a decision which
apparently is still part of our constitutional "law".
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more difficult and an alternative political forum is set up to canvass  the issues
at  the first  stage,  then many  of  the  questions  posed  to  the  Supreme  Court
since  1949  would  never  bother  a  court  again.  It  is  even  possible  that  we
could  become  accustomed  to  the  demise  of  judicial  review  and  it  might
gradually  wither  away  of  its  own  accord.
In this paper, I have  tried to  sketch  the logic in  the evolution  of  some
of the fundamental ideas of Canadian  constitutionalism. At the root of any on-
going  intellectual  discipline  there  are  certain  paradigm  assumptions  which
define the direction  of enquiry at any one time.53  Ordinarily, the participants
in this intellectual  enterprise do not focus on and  question these assumptions.
This  is  as  it  should  be  because  no  collaborative  progress  in  understanding
could  ever  be  accomplished  unless  there  is  tentative  agreement  about  the
fundamental  concepts.  After  a  period  of  time,  though,  incongruities  and
discontinuities  in these  assumptions  begin to make  themselves felt in  specific
problems  and  their  cumulative  result  begins  to  dissolve  the  established
consensus.  When  this  occurs,  we  are  ready  for  the  articulation  of  a new
framework for inquiry which  can  redirect  the intellectual  search  along  more
satisfying  avenues.  I believe  we  are  at this  stage  in  our current  assessment
of the judicial  umpiring  of the federal  system.
As  I have  said,  judicial  review  originated  with  the  notion  that  the
Canadian  constitution - the British North  America  Act - was  an  Imperial
statute  and thus  fit  for  administration  in  the  ordinary  courts  of  law.  The
logical  corollaries  of  this  view  were  that  private  citizens  had  standing  to
require the court to invalidate  subordinate Canadian laws  which were beyond
the  powers  of the  enacting  legislature  because  they  went  beyond  the  limits
laid down by this Imperial  statute. Moreover, this  finding of invalidity could
be made by the courts even though the actual recipient  of the legislative power
had not yet exercised it, because its legislative  jurisdiction in the area was not
concurrent.  In  fact,  the  original  donee  of  this  legislative  power  could  not
even consent to  its exercise by the other jurisdiction  through a form of inter-
delegation because of the binding and authoritative character of the basic law.
This originally coherent paradigm began to fall apart because the demands
of social change for redistribution of  political authority could not be reflected
in  explicit  amendments  to  the  constitution.  The  burden  was  placed  on the
courts to make  the necessary  adjustments  and  this immediately  placed  them
in a dilemma.  Taking one view  of the nature of their role, they could adhere
to the  letter of  the  original  document  which  would  only have  the  effect  of
placing a constitutional strait-jacket around our governmental  institutions.  On
a more  adequate  view  of  their  obligations,  they  could begin  consciously  to
update  the  original  allocation  of  legislative  authority  in  the light  of  current
social needs. Unfortunately, this appeared to result in severe pressures on the
structure  of a judicial process which was designed  for the adjudication  of dis-
putes within a framework of law.
The discontinuity  which is  thus  apparent  in  Canadian  constitutionalism
lies in the  incapacity  of the institution  of the  ordinary court  to  perform  the
53 The notion of "paradigm"  I have  drawn of  course from Kuhn,  The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, a  work which is extremely  helpful in trying  to understand  changes
in fundamental intellectual assumptions.
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function  of  constitutional  innovation  and adjustment.  When  we perceive  the
discontinuity, it is no longer  difficult to  discover the reasons  for its existence.
A  statutory  enactment  which  has  been  effectively  frozen  for  more  than  a
century, but which purports  to govern as fluid and politically-charged  an area
as the allocation of legislative  authority, must inevitably lose its legal integrity
no matter how wide a view we may take of the nature of law. I have suggested
that when we perceive  the true character  of constitutional  decision-making  in
the courts, at least the corollaries of traditional judicial review must be altered.
We should no longer allow private citizens'  standing to impeach legislation on
the grounds that it has encroached  on the exclusive  preserve of another legis-
lative body. As far as citizens are concerned, this would leave the constitutional
regime  with  the legal status  of "functional  concurrency",  except  in the  rare
cases  of contradictory  enactments  to which  the courts  must  apply a  rule  of
paramountcy. Moreover,  the courts would no longer interfere  with legislative
power to make ongoing adjustments  in the allocation of legislative jurisdiction
through  various  techniques  of  delegation.  Each  of these  doctrinal  changes  is
based on the recognition  that we do not have  a system of constitutional  law
which citizens have a right to have applied to their disputes  in  court. Rather,
we  have a political  process  of adjustment of our governmental  institutions  to
social  change.  The primary  source  of such  adjustment  must be a continuous
process  of bargaining  and  compromise  and it  is  the  respective  governments
rather than the private litigants and the courts which must be seen to have the
direct interest and responsibility to preserve the integrity of Canadian federalism.
In many respects the  "law in action"  is not too far removed  from these
proposals.  Private  litigants  are  rarely  successful  in  securing Supreme  Court
decisions  which  invalidate  legislation  (although  their theoretical  standing  to
do so has, if anything, been strengthened by the B.C. Power case). Functional
concurrency  appears  to  be  the  operative  rule  at  least  in  the  area  of  penal
regulation of private behaviour.54 The limitations on legislative inter-delegation
after  the Coughlin case appear to be little more  than verbal  (if uncontrolled
"incorporation  by reference"  is to be permitted). Nonetheless,  judicial review
continues  to be  an ever-present  possibility and it appears  unquestioned  that
the courts  must remain the final  and authoritative  umpire in cases  where  the
political institutions  do not agree about the allocation of jurisdiction.  For the
reasons  I have  given,  I would  draw  the further  conclusion  that  federalism
disputes  are inherently non-justifiable and, in the absence  of meaningful  legal
standards,  the  Court  should  not  be  asked  to  intervene  in  these  essentially
political disputes.
I would conclude  my analysis  of the judicial  contribution  to the future
of Canadian  federalism  by a loose  paraphrase of the conclusion  to a famous
analysis of the courts' contribution to labour relations.55 "The federal allocation
of legislative  authority  is  an  integral part of our  system  of self-government.
When it works well,  it does not need the sanction of constitutional law. It is
only  when the system  breaks  down that the Court's  aid is  invoked.  But the
54  See Leigh,  The  Criminal  Law  Power:  A  Move  Towards  Functional Concurrency
(1967),  5 Alta. Law Rev. 237.
55 Shulman,  Reason,  Contract, and Law in Labour Relations  (1955),  68  Harv. Law
Rev. 999 at 1024.
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Supreme  Court cannot, by  occasional  sporadic  decisions,  restore  the parties'
continuing  relationship and  its intervention  in such cases may seriously  affect
the on-going system of self-government. When their autonomous  system breaks
down, might not the parties better be left to the usual methods for adjustment
of political disputes, rather than to court actions on the constitution? I suggest
that the law stay out - but, mind you, not the lawyers".